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7534 ε.Κ. (A.M.) | 4723 黄帝历 | 26 | 3 | 2026 μ.Χ. | 1447 سنة هجرية (A.H.) | 7 μ.Κ. (VII A.Q.)
Δημοσιεύτηκε άρθρο για Το Τέλος της Μεγάλης Παρέκκλισης στην περιοδική έκδοση της Κινεζικής Ακαδημίας Κοινωνικών Επιστημών (CASS), το μέσο ενημέρωσης ‘Chinese Social Sciences Net’ (CSSN) και την ακαδημαϊκή εφημερίδα ‘Chinese Social Sciences Today’ (CSST).
Με αφορμή τη φετινή θεματική του Boao Forum for Asia ―ένα ετήσιο συνέδριο που αποτελεί πλατφόρμα διαλόγου υψηλού επιπέδου για ηγετικές προσωπικότητες, πολιτικούς, επιχειρηματίες και ακαδημαϊκούς από 29 κράτη―, ο Chen Mirong, συντάκτης και ερευνητής που συνεργάζεται με την Κινεζική Ακαδημία Κοινωνικών Επιστημών και το μέσο ενημέρωσης που τελεί υπό την αιγίδα της, το ‘Chinese Social Sciences Net’, παρουσίασε σε άρθρο, μέσα από τη δική του ερμηνευτική ματιά, την κεντρική ιδέα, επιχειρήματα και θέσεις από το βιβλίο μου.
Ακολουθεί το άρθρο για Το Τέλος της Μεγάλης Παρέκκλισης με τίτλο The Reversion to Civilisational Plurality: The “Age of the Great Deviation” Is Coming to an End | 文明多样性复归：历史“大偏离时代”进入尾声, όπως δημοσιεύτηκε στην κινεζική γλώσσα, σε εικόνα (I) και κείμενο (III), και η αγγλική του μετάφραση (II), καθώς και σύνδεσμοι για το άρθρο σε έκδοση e-paper και PDF στην ακαδημαϊκή εφημερίδα ‘Chinese Social Sciences Today’ και στη μορφή που δημοσιεύτηκε αρχικά στην ιστοσελίδα ‘Chinese Social Sciences Net’ της Κινεζικής Ακαδημίας Κοινωνικών Επιστημών.
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The Reversion to Civilisational Plurality:
The “Age of the Great Deviation” Is Coming to an End
23 March 2026 — Chen Mirong, China Social Sciences Net / China Social Sciences Daily
The 2026 Annual Conference of the Boao Forum for Asia will be held in Boao, Hainan, from March 24 to 27. The theme of this year’s conference is “Shaping a Shared Future: New Context, New Opportunities, New Cooperation.” Against the backdrop of accelerating changes in a world undergoing a once-in-a-century transformation, Asia is experiencing historic, structural, and systemic shifts.
Today, Asia, as the region with the world’s largest population—home to more than 50% of the global population—boasts multiple engines of economic growth. Asia’s rise is no longer a one-dimensional economic narrative, but rather a systemic transformation driven by the synergy of multiple forces, including demographics, technology, institutions, and culture. Dimitris Peponis, author of the Greek book The End of the Great Deviation, stated in an interview with this newspaper that the world is entering a brand-new macro-historical cycle. From the early 19th century to the mid-21st century, an era that began as Eurocentric, gradually evolved into Western dominance, and was characterized by Anglo-American hegemony is approaching its conclusion. He refers to this era as the “Age of the Great Deviation.” At the same time, Asia is returning to the center of the world stage.
From the “Great Deviation” to “Recalibration”
Peponis argues that the defining feature of the “Age of the Great Deviation” lies precisely in its deviation from a far more enduring historical norm in the long river of human history.
From the first century CE until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries—a span of approximately eighteen centuries—the centre of global economic gravity remained anchored in the Chinese heartland and the Indian subcontinent. Peponis emphasized that it was only in the past two to three hundred years that this historical economic order was disrupted by the rise of Western Europe and thereafter supplanted by North American dominance. From a longue durée perspective, the West’s centrality over the past two centuries thus constitutes an anomalous departure from historical norms.
The Singaporean scholar Kishore Mahbubani similarly contends that these two centuries of Western predominance represent an exception rather than the rule. The twenty-first century, he suggests, is witnessing the end of this anomaly and the restoration of historical equilibrium.
In Peponis’s view, the rise of China and the broader resurgence of Asia signal the closing phase of this deviation. This is not merely a shift in aggregate economic output, but a profound reconfiguration of global influence, intellectual production, and the leadership of civilisational dialogue. The continued convening and growing influence of the Boao Forum for Asia itself constitutes an institutional microcosm and intellectual arena of this process of “recalibration”.
The “Rebalancing” of Demographic Structure and the Urbanization Wave
Asia’s return is not without foundation; its deepest and most irreversible basis lies in the fundamental reshaping of global population patterns, demographic structures and human settlement. Peponis provides a thorough, in-depth analysis analysis of how these transformations underpin the end of the “Age of the Great Deviation”.
First is the epochal shift in human habitation. In the early nineteenth century, only 5–10 per cent of the global population resided in urban centres. By the early twenty-first century, over half of humanity lived in cities, metropolitan areas, and urban agglomerations. At the same time, urban populations outside the North Atlantic region (Europe and North America) have increasingly assumed centrality and influence. In Asia alone, approximately 1.1 billion people moved into urban centres between 1990 and 2015. During the same period, Africa’s urban population doubled, highlighting the acceleration of urbanisation beyond traditionally Western-dominated regions. A report released by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs in November 2025 indicates that 19 of the world’s 33 megacities, with populations exceeding 10 million, are located in Asia.
Second is the disruptive “rebalancing” of global population weight. Peponis illustrates the magnitude of this transformation through striking comparisons: roughly two decades ago, Africa’s population surpassed Europe’s for the first time in recorded history; in 1950, the combined populations of Turkey, Egypt, and Iran were smaller than that of Germany alone, whereas today Egypt’s population alone approximates the combined populations of Germany and the Netherlands. More striking still, Nigeria’s population now exceeds the combined populations of Germany, France, and Italy. In continental terms, approximately 59 per cent of the world’s population resides in Asia, 19 per cent in Africa, 9 per cent in a politically fluid Europe, 8 per cent in Latin America, and less than 5 per cent in North America.
Third is the strategic divergence in age structures. As Peponis summarises: “The world’s youth is primarily concentrated in Africa, the middle-aged population is globally distributed, while aging societies and gerontocracy have become defining characteristics of Europe.” In most developed countries outside the United States, demographic ageing, shrinking working-age populations, and contraction in economically active cohorts will place increasing strain on political systems and welfare regimes.
This structural dilemma stands in stark generational contrast to the demographic vitality and potential “demographic dividend” possessed by Asia (especially South and Southeast Asia) and Africa. This shift in the demographic foundation is a key reason why the historical balance is tilting toward Asia.
The Collapse of the “End of History” Illusion
The “Age of the Great Deviation” is reflected not only in economic and demographic structures but is also deeply inscribed in the ideological sphere. Peponis characterises the post-Cold War unipolar era as one in which the US-led Atlantic bloc, under the banner of the “end of history” thesis, launched what he describes as a “democratic crusade”, vigorously promoting Western-style democracy as the sole legitimate model. He rejects the notion of a universally applicable democratic template, asserting that democracy is a shared value of humanity rather than the exclusive preserve of a handful of states.
In Peponis’s view, China’s rise holds significance that transcends mere economic indicators. He stated: “Within the next decade, China will become the world’s largest economy in terms of nominal GDP. For over a decade, China has consistently maintained its position as the world’s leading goods trading nation. This will mark a historic turning point: for the first time since the reign of George III or the Victorian era, the global economy will be led by a country that is neither Atlantic‑based nor English‑speaking, and which is neither organised under a liberal system nor governed by a two‑party political structure.” This development challenges the entrenched narrative—formed during the “Age of Great Deviation”—which equates “the West” with “modernity” and the “only successful model”.
Peponis further conceptualises China as a “civilisational state”—a global actor shaped by a distinct civilisation and worldview, endowed with intrinsic autonomy in its interests and value system. China’s rejuvenation implies that the global system must accommodate and engage seriously with governance models, developmental philosophies, and international relations concepts rooted in non-Western civilisations with deep historical foundations. This constitutes a powerful deconstruction of Western-centric ideology and historiography, and signals the tangible return of civilisational plurality.
A New Equilibrium Amid Discontinuity and Continuity
From a geopolitical perspective, Peponis invokes Halford Mackinder’s 1904 “World Island” theory and its contemporary resonance. Asia, as the eastern extremity of the “World Island” comprising Asia, Africa, and Europe, has historically stood in geographical contrast with the American continent, which serves as a peripheral region.
Peponis argues that when key regions within the “World Island” experience power vacuums or intense competition, instability or fragmentation often follows—strategies that serve to preserve the centrality of the United States and North America within the global order. Similarly, Europe’s potential “deindustrialisation” may be interpreted as part of this mechanism for maintaining geopolitical balance.
“Our world is undergoing fundamental reconstruction,” Peponis concludes. “On the one hand, through unprecedented ruptures and transformations; on the other, through the continuity of history and the return of ancient equilibria—albeit grounded in new social realities and technological foundations—the global order is being reshaped. While this era appears radically discontinuous with the past, the essence of things remains unchanged; attempts to distort that essence are ultimately futile and transient.”
The “ruptures and transformations” manifest in technological revolutions—particularly digital technologies and artificial intelligence—that disrupt power structures and modes of production; in global crises such as climate change that challenge traditional development paradigms; and in the strategic uncertainty produced by the disintegration of unipolar hegemony.
The “return of ancient equilibria”, by contrast, is evident in the re-centering of economic and demographic gravity in eastern Eurasia, the coexistence of multiple civilisational centres in place of a single hegemonic civilisation, and the dynamic reconfiguration of centre–periphery relations. This represents, in part, a reversion to the historical norm before the “Great Deviation,” albeit at a higher technological level and with deeper interconnectivity.
In Peponis’s philosophy of history, the assertion that “the essence of things remains unchanged” suggests that the fundamental rhythms of history—great power rise and decline, civilisational interaction and competition, and the plurality of developmental paths—have never ceased. The West must confront not merely the loss of hegemony but the recognition that its two-century dominance was historically exceptional. For Asia, and particularly for a civilisational state such as China, the challenge is to revitalise ancient heritage while creatively addressing unprecedented global challenges and contributing public goods and new visions of order.
A Forum for Dialogue at the Threshold of a New Cycle
Within this context, the 2026 Boao Forum for Asia provides a crucial platform for dialogue and reflection between Asia and the wider world. Its discussions on advancing regional economic integration and addressing global challenges speak directly to the core questions facing the construction of a “post-Great Deviation” global order.
Asia’s return does not signify a simplistic “rise of the East and decline of the West”, nor a mere transfer of power. Rather, it heralds a more complex—and potentially healthier—global landscape: one that is multipolar rather than unipolar, pluralistic rather than monolithic, and characterised by the coexistence of multiple civilisations rather than the dominance of one. It marks the end of the ideological arrogance and rigid centre–periphery narratives of the “Age of the Great Deviation”, and the beginning of a difficult but necessary search for a new equilibrium based on “harmony without uniformity”.
Peponis’s analysis ultimately points to a sober conclusion: although this process may be accompanied by friction and turbulence, the deeper currents of history are already discernible. For the West, this entails recognising the historical contingency and particularity of its dominance and learning to reposition itself within a more equal and plural global order. For the world as a whole, it requires transcending the mindset of the “Age of the Great Deviation” in order to move toward a more inclusive and sustainable new historical cycle.
◇ Chen Mirong, China Social Sciences Net
[Editors: Yao Xiaodan (Print) Hu Zixuan (Online)]
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文明多样性复归：历史 “大偏离时代” 进入尾声
2026-03-23 作者：陈密容 来源：中国社会科学网-中国社会科学报
博鳌亚洲论坛2026年年会将于3月24—27日在海南博鳌召开，此次年会主题为“塑造共同未来：新形势、新机遇、新合作”。在世界百年未有之大变局加速演进的背景下，亚洲正在经历历史性、结构性、系统性变迁。
如今，亚洲作为全球人口数量最多的地区，聚集了超过全球人口总数50%的人口，拥有多个经济增长引擎。亚洲的崛起已不再是单一维度的经济故事，而是一场基于人口、技术、制度和文化多重力量共振的体系性变革。希腊后资本主义文明研究中心副研究员迪米特里斯·佩彭尼斯（Dimitris Peponis）在接受本报记者采访时表示，世界正在迎来一个崭新的宏观历史周期。从19世纪初到21世纪中叶，一个最初以欧洲为中心，逐渐演变为西方主导，并以英美霸权为特征的时代即将落幕，他将这个时代称为历史的“大偏离时代”（Age of the Great Deviation）。与此同时，亚洲正在重新走向世界舞台的中央。
从“大偏离”到“再校准”
佩彭尼斯表示，“大偏离时代”这一概念的核心在于其“偏离”属性，它偏离了人类历史长河中一个更为持久的常态。
“自公元1世纪至18世纪末19世纪初，在长达18个世纪的岁月里，世界经济重心始终位于华夏大地及印度次大陆。”佩彭尼斯强调，直到过去两三百年间，这一历史经济秩序才被西欧的崛起打破，而北美此后又取代了西欧的主导地位。因此，过去两个世纪西方在全球事务中的历史中心性，从大历史视角审视，是“偏离常态的例外”。
新加坡学者马凯硕（Kishore Mahbubani）也认为，西方主导世界历史的这二百年，实则是一场偏离常态的例外。因此，21世纪所见证的正是这种异常的终结与常态的回归。
在佩彭尼斯看来，中国的崛起和亚洲作为整体力量的复兴是这一偏离周期正走向终结的标志。这不仅是经济总量的转移，更意味着国际影响力版图、思想生产源头和文明对话主导权的深刻重构。博鳌亚洲论坛的持续举办及其影响力的日益扩大，本身即是这一“再校准”进程的制度化缩影与思想舞台。
人口结构与城市化浪潮的“再平衡”
亚洲的回归并非无源之水，其最深厚、最不可逆的基础在于全球人口结构与人类居住空间的根本性重塑。佩彭尼斯深入剖析了这一变迁如何为“大偏离时代”的终结提供了基础动力。
首先，是人类聚落的史诗性变迁。19世纪初，全球仅有5%—10%的人口居住在城市中心。而到21世纪初，全球已有超过50%的人口生活在城市、大都市和都市圈中。与此同时，北大西洋地区（欧美）以外的城市人口正逐渐获得中心地位和越来越大的影响力。“仅在亚洲，1990—2015年间就有约11亿人口迁移至城市中心。同期，非洲城市人口也翻了一番，凸显出传统西方主导区域之外地区城市化进程的加速态势。”联合国经济和社会事务部2025年11月发布的报告显示，全球33个千万以上人口“特大城市”中19个在亚洲。
其次，是全球人口权重的颠覆性“再平衡”。佩彭尼斯以一系列对比揭示了剧变的规模：约20年前，非洲人口在有记录的人类历史上首次超越欧洲；1950年，土耳其、埃及和伊朗三国人口总和不及德国一国，而如今仅埃及一国人口就与德国和荷兰人口总和相当；更惊人的是，尼日利亚人口总数已经超过了德国、法国和意大利的人口总和。从洲际分布看，全球人口约有59%居住在亚洲，19%在非洲，9%在政治边界持续变动的欧洲，8%在拉丁美洲，而北美大陆人口数量在全球人口总数中的占比不到5%。
最后，是人口年龄结构的战略性差异。佩彭尼斯概括道：“全球青年人口主要聚集在非洲，中年人口实现了全球化分布，而老龄化社会与老人政治则成为欧洲的典型特征。” 在除美国以外的主要发达国家，人口老龄化、劳动年龄人口的减少与经济活动人口的收缩相互叠加，将使其政治体系与福利制度承受更大的压力。
这一结构性困境与亚洲（尤其南亚、东南亚）及非洲所拥有的人口活力与潜在“人口红利”形成代际性反差。这种人口基本盘的迁移是历史天平向亚洲倾斜的重要原因。
“历史终结”幻想终将破灭
“大偏离时代”不仅体现在经济和人口上，更深刻烙印在意识形态领域。佩彭尼斯将冷战后的单极霸权时期描述为美国主导的大西洋阵营打着“历史终结论”旗帜，发动的一场极力宣扬西方式民主是唯一正确模式的“民主圣战”，认为不存在放之四海皆准的民主模式，更不存在所谓“普世唯一”的模板，“民主是全人类共同价值，不是少数国家的专利”。
在佩彭尼斯看来，中国的崛起具有超越单纯经济指标的意义。他说：“中国将在未来10年内成为名义GDP全球第一的经济体。过去10余年，中国长期保持世界第一货物贸易大国的地位。这将成为一个历史性转折点：自乔治三世统治时期或维多利亚时代以来，全球经济将首次由非大西洋国家、非英语国家、非自由主义体制且非两党制政体的国家引领。”这不仅是一个国家经济体量的变化，更是对“大偏离时代”所形成的“西方=现代=唯一成功模式”这一叙事的根本性质疑与突破。
在佩彭尼斯眼中，中国是“文明型国家”，是独特文明与世界观孕育的全球主导型力量，其利益诉求和价值体系具有与生俱来的主体性和自主性。中国的复兴与强大意味着全球体系必须容纳并认真对待源于非西方文明的、具有深厚历史根基的治理模式、发展哲学与国际关系理念。这本身就是对“大偏离时代”西方中心主义意识形态和历史解释框架的最有力解构，是文明多样性的现实复归。
断裂与延续中的新均衡
从地缘政治视角出发，佩彭尼斯借助英国地理学家哈尔福德·麦金德（Halford Mackinder）在1904年提出的“世界岛”理论及其当代回响提出，亚洲作为“亚非欧”这个“世界岛”的最东端，始终与作为边缘地带的美洲大陆形成地理对照。
佩彭尼斯分析道，过去一段时间内，“当‘世界岛’关键区域出现权力真空或遭遇激烈竞争时，某种形式的动荡或分裂往往随之而来——这种策略旨在确保美国及整个北美在全球秩序中的核心地位。同理，欧洲潜在的‘去工业化’趋势，亦可视为维持此种地缘平衡的机制”。
“我们的世界正在经历根本性重构。”佩彭尼斯总结道，“一方面通过前所未有的断裂与突变，另一方面又借助历史延续性与古老均衡的复归（尽管依托新生的社会现实与技术基础），全球秩序正在被重新塑造。这个时代看似与过往彻底割裂，但事物的本质未曾改变，任何试图扭曲本质的努力终将是徒劳且短暂的。”
他认为，“断裂与突变”体现在：技术革命（尤其是数字技术与人工智能）对权力和生产方式的颠覆，气候变化等全球性危机对传统发展模式的挑战，以及单极霸权体系的瓦解所带来的战略不确定性。这些都是新的变量。
“古老均衡的复归”体现在：经济与人口重心回归亚欧大陆东部，多文明中心并存格局取代单一文明霸权，中心与边缘的关系进入新一轮动态调整。这是对“大偏离”之前历史常态的某种回归，尽管是在更高的技术层级和更紧密的互联程度上。
而在佩彭尼斯的历史哲学中，“事物的本质未曾改变”或许意味着大国兴衰、文明竞合、发展道路多元这些历史的基本旋律从未停歇。西方需要理解的，不仅是霸权的丧失，更是“这种持续两个世纪的支配地位本身即是历史异数”。对亚洲而言，特别是对中国这样的文明型国家而言，挑战在于如何在复兴古老荣耀与智慧的同时，创造性地应对全新的全球性挑战，提供国际公共产品与秩序理念。
新周期的前沿对话场
在此背景下，博鳌亚洲论坛2026年年会为亚洲与世界提供了一个至关重要的对话与思考平台。论坛所探讨的推动区域经济一体化、探索应对全球性挑战等议题，恰恰是“后大偏离时代”全球秩序构建必须回答的核心问题。
亚洲的回归，并不意味着简单的“东升西降”或权力转移，而是宣告了一个更复杂也可能更健康的全球图景的到来：那将是一个多极化而非单极、多元化而非一元、多文明共生而非一种文明主导的世界。它终结的是“大偏离时代”的意识形态傲慢与中心—边缘的固化叙事；它迎来的是不同文明基于自身主体性，在应对共同挑战中寻求“和而不同”新均衡的艰难探索。
佩彭尼斯的论述最终指向一个冷静的结论：这个过程可能伴随摩擦与动荡，但历史的深层流向已然清晰。对西方而言，应直面自身主导地位的历史特殊性，并学习在新的、更平等的多元格局中定位自身。对世界而言，则需要共同超越“大偏离时代”的思维方式，携手迈向一个更具包容性也更可持续的历史新周期。
◇中国社会科学报记者 陈密容
【编辑：姚晓丹（报纸） 胡子轩（网络）】
Το άρθρο σε έκδοση e-paper και PDF στην ακαδημαϊκή εφημερίδα ‘Chinese Social Sciences Today’ και στη μορφή που δημοσιεύτηκε αρχικά στην ιστοσελίδα ‘Chinese Social Sciences Net’ της Κινεζικής Ακαδημίας Κοινωνικών Επιστημών.
Δημήτρης Β. Πεπόνης
.~`~.
Το βιβλίο μου κυκλοφορεί από τις Εκδόσεις Τόπος με τίτλο:
Το Τέλος της Μεγάλης Παρέκκλισης
Από την Ουκρανία και την Πανδημία στη Νέα Πλανητική Τάξη
Δημήτρης Β. Πεπόνης
Μπορείτε να προμηθευτείτε και να παραγγείλετε Το Τέλος της Μεγάλης Παρέκκλισης (Τόπος) σε όλα τα βιβλιοπωλεία πανελλαδικά. Ενδεικτικοί σύνδεσμοι με το βιβλίο: Πολιτεία, Ιανός, Πρωτοπορία, Public κ.λπ.
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Αν θεωρείτε πως ο χρόνος που αφιερώνεται και οι ιδέες που εκφράζονται έχουν αξία, μπορείτε να χρησιμοποιήσετε το κουμπί Donate προκειμένου να συμβάλλετε στην απρόσκοπτη συνέχιση του εγχειρήματος της Κοσμοϊδιογλωσσίας. Ευχαριστώ.
7534 ε.Κ. (A.M.) | 4723 黄帝历 | 26 | 3 | 2026 μ.Χ. | 1447 سنة هجرية (A.H.) | 7 μ.Κ. (VII A.Q.)
